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Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other
Abject Lessons from the History of Science
DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Forensic identification has long been a core component of the
criminal justice system. Practitioners of forensic identification typically
claim a scientific basis for the technologies and practices they employ in
courtrooms everyday. These claims to the mantle of science, however,
have varying merit. Some forensic expert opinions, such as in DNA
profiling, are based on sophisticated technologies that were developed
through rigorous and extensive testing and are limited to statistical
statements adequately supported by data. A large number of experts-in
such areas as latent fingerprints, firearms identification, handwriting,
bitemarks, and many others-have no such sound scientific footings.
These experts rely on little more than anecdote and supposition, all
generally buttressed by pronouncements from members of insular
professional guilds. Given the profound weaknesses associated with
these forensic specialties, they are likely to someday largely pass from
the scene as has been true of so many other once-believed suppositions
masquerading as science, ranging from blood letting to phrenology.
Indeed, the forensic identification sciences that have little or no
research basis and depend largely on the subjective judgment of
practitioners-"anecdotal forensics" -have much in common with
phrenology.' In particular, they are failures as science.2 Yet, neither have
* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law.
i. Others have similarly drawn the connection between forensics and phrenology. Professor
Jane Campbell Moriarty, for example, observed as follows:
[P]hrenology shares an important trait with forensic individualization evidence: conclusions are
not based upon independent testing but upon "scientific observations of countless samples." Both
are experience-based conclusions that rest on the foundation that: (i) the science is valid because
of extensive observations: (2) those skilled in the science can do it properly: and (3) the
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been complete failures. In the nineteenth century, phrenologists believed
that they could describe a person's personality traits and intellectual
strengths by measuring the shape of his or her head.3 Phrenology held
sway among many professionals in medicine and psychology and was
seemingly based on extensive observation and long experience.
Moreover, one of the central tenets of phrenology has been borne out by
modern neuroscience. Phrenology was based on the belief that brain
function was relatively particularized, thus lending itself to ready
identification It turned out, however, that phrenologists were wrong
about everything else. Phrenologists, for instance, were correct that brain
function was largely localized, but entirely incorrect that these functions
would be manifested by large changes in the brain that were measurable
on the skull. Anecdotal forensics are similarly situated today. They are
based on extensive observation and long experience, but are likely to be
largely incorrect as they are currently practiced. Like phrenology,
anecdotal forensics have probably happened upon a few truths, but even
these are likely to be inaccurate in the details. One hundred years from
now, anecdotal forensics will almost certainly join phrenology and similar
notorious beliefs in the annals of abject lessons learned in the history of
science.
This Article focuses on the anecdotal forensic sciences. These
include areas of forensic identification such as latent fingerprints,
firearms, toolmarks, bitemarks, and non-DNA hair comparison, among
others. They also encompass certain nonidentification subject areas such
as aspects of arson investigation and pathology. An anecdotal forensic
science is any specialty area that leads to expert testimony that is based
primarily on inductive experience ("experience-based") to develop and
test its hypotheses and contains a substantial degree of subjective
judgment in its application. Although it is possible to have subject areas
that suffer only one of these deficiencies in method-that is, subjectively
based but objectively applied or objectively based but subjectively
applied-the two together are particularly noxious to truth. This double-
underlying theory is valid because of the care used by the practitioners.
Jane Campbell Moriarty, "Misconvictions," Science, and the Ministers of Justice, 86 NEB. L. REv. i, 17
(2007); see also Troy Duster, Selective Arrests, an Ever-Expanding DNA Forensic Database, and the
Specter of an Early-Twenty-First-Century Equivalent of Phrenology, in DNA AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE TECHNOLOGY OF JUSTICE 315 (David Lazer ed., 2004); Jennifer L. Mnookin,
Scripting Expertise: The History of Handwriting Identification Evidence and the Judicial Construction
of Reliability, 87 VA. L. REV. 1723, 18io (2oo1).
2. On the failures of phrenology, see ROBERT M. YOUNG, MIND, BRAIN AND ADAPTATION IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY (970). On the failures of anecdotal forensics, see Michael J. Saks & David L.
Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN.
REV. L. & Soc. Sci. (forthcoming Aug. 20o8).
3. See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE 639-41 (J.L. Heilbron ed., 2003).
4. See YOUNG, supra note 2, at 23.
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barreled subjectivism permits forensic experts wide latitude in practice
while rendering the subject areas largely invulnerable to falsification.
Simply put, anecdotal forensics are pseudo sciences.
I. THE ANATOMY OF A FAILED SCIENCE
Although many beliefs in the history of science have come to be
understood as having been wrong-including such notables as the
convictions that the Earth was flat, that the sun revolved around the
Earth, or that good health came from a balance between the bodily
liquids (i.e., humors)-phrenology qualifies as the poster child for
historical scientific error. In most contexts of failed science, it is unduly
critical, even pretentious, to look back through the lens of contemporary
knowledge and criticize an earlier time's naivet6. Phrenology, however, is
a special case. Its intellectual bankruptcy was apparent early on.5 Beliefs
such as the geocentric view of the universe, for instance, can be readily
understood given the context of the times in which they were believed
and the limited tools at scientists' disposal to test these beliefs. Since
more powerful scientific tests were not readily available, the failures of
history can be forgiven. Similarly, the theory of humors has intuitive
appeal even today and the subject of disease is sufficiently complex that
modern observers feel no sense of empirical superiority when they hear,
for instance, that George Washington was bled four times before he
finally succumbed to his respiratory ailment -or some combination of his
ailment and his therapy.6 But phrenology is different. Looking back, it
seems that phrenologists, and those that came to rely on them, should
have known better. The science of the day was more than adequate to
demonstrate that phrenology had no basis;7 but that science was widely
ignored.
Phrenology's success in the nineteenth century is largely attributable
to its assuming the form of science and its embrace of rationalism.
Phrenology was derived from the work of the Viennese physician Franz
Joseph Gall.8 Gall believed that the mind is wholly situated in the brain,
that distinct faculties or traits were separately located in the brain, that
the size of the brain is a function of the respective strengths of these
faculties or traits, and that the surface of the skull provides an accurate
index of these characteristics.' Gall's hypotheses were originally based
5. Id. at to.
6. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LABORATORY OF JUSTICE: THE SUPREME COURT'S 200-YEAR STRUGGLE TO
INTEGRATE SCIENCE AND THE LAW 1-5 (2004) (relating the story of George Washington's death).
7. YOUNG, supra note 2, at to (noting 184os reference to phrenology as "that sinkhole of human
folly and prating coxcombry").
8. See FRANZ JOSEPH GALL, THE ANATOMY AND PHYSIOLOGY OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM IN GENERAL,
AND OF THE BRAIN IN PARTICULAR (1796).
9. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 12.
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and tested on his family members and friends. He eventually developed
an elaborate chart of the head that he believed associated certain
behavioral characteristics with the shape and size of a person's head.
Phrenology was thus largely objectively described, in that practitioners
were ostensibly obligated to follow the schemata of the chart to make
statements about the person.
Gall's elaborate description of brain function, however, had only a
thin patina of research behind it. Indeed, his evidence was primarily
anecdotal.' Moreover, despite attracting disciples such as Johann
Christoph Spurzheim, who conducted anatomical studies to test Gall's
theories, phrenology never garnered widespread acceptance in the
mainstream scientific community." Ironically, for present purposes at
least, Spurzheim's most important proselyte was George Combe, a
prominent lawyer in Edinburgh. 2 Combe authored numerous books
popularizing phrenology, including the best selling The Constitution of
Man.3 Combe too produced a disciple, Hewett Cottrell Watson, who
studied phrenology with Combe, because the subject was not taught at
Edinburgh University. 4 Watson wrote Statistics of Phrenology, a title
whose scientific pretensions were matched by its intellectual dishonesty. 5
The book contained no statistics, instead offering little more than a
commemorative to phrenology's supposed accomplishments.
Although phrenology and its predecessor physiognomy never gained
a toehold in mainstream science, it resonated in the forensic community.
In criminal cases, head, face and body shapes had two principal possible
uses, the first concerned identifying past criminals and the second aspired
to predict future ones. The first was in the modern fashion, and was
primarily associated with Alphonse Bertillon's system of cataloguing
bodily characteristics for purposes of identification.'6 Bertillon, in effect,
sought to develop a kind of "body-print," an identification system that
would rival the developing field of fingerprints.'7 As Professor Simon
Cole explained, "Bertillon envisioned nothing less than the complete
10. OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 639-40 ("[Although
Gall] initiated studies on the correlation between structures and functions ...his evidence was
anecdotal.").
i i. Id. at 640.
12. Id.
13. GEORGE COMBE, THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN IN RELATION TO THE NATURAL LAWS (Cassell &
Co. 1893) (1828); see also OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at
639-40.
14. Id.
15. HEWE'T C. WATSON, STATISTICS OF PHRENOLOGY: BEING A SKETCH OF THE PROGRESS AND
PRESENT STATE OF THAT SCIENCE IN THE BRITISH ISLANDS. (1836); see also OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE, supra note 3, at 639-40.
I6 See SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL
IDENTIFICATION 32 (2O01).
17. Id.
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reduction of human identity to a language of notations which could be
organized and accessed at will."' 8 But in nineteenth century practice,
mapping the body and head also had a more profound potential use,
borne of phrenology, that of detecting criminal types.'9 Throughout the
late nineteenth century, the typing of every kind of physical trait was
widely in vogue, often veering back and forth between identifying those
who had previously committed crimes and attempting to predict those
who would do so in the future."0 Whatever the purpose, however, the
scientific basis for such practices lay in experience and anecdote. In time,
both Gall's phrenology and Bertillon's anthropometric system faded as
their respective limitations became increasingly obvious. In the case of
anthropometry, fingerprinting would prove a more efficient competitor.'
Modern anecdotal forensics are similar to phrenology in a variety of
disturbing ways. Foremost, perhaps, anecdotal forensic scientists do not,
and have not, tested their hypotheses in any serious manner." They look
only for confirmations of their practices and rationalize or ignore
contradictory evidence. Experience is the leitmotif of their methodology.
Indeed, some anecdotal forensic experts have their own phrenological
chart, the method known as ACE-V, an ostensibly objective method with
a large subjective component that allows considerable latitude in
practice 3.2  The acronym stands for Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation,
and Verification. 4 ACE-V began with latent fingerprint examiners and
has been increasingly adopted by other identification sciences.5
Consider the example of latent fingerprint identification, once the
gold standard of forensics. The ACE-V method is the backbone of latent
print identification, and the cogency of the entire enterprise pretty much
depends on it. In the first step, analysis, the examiner looks at the quality
and quantity of detail that is present, often aided by magnification of
18. Id. at 49.
19. Id. at 57 ("To criminal anthropologists, the distinction between using the criminal body as a
link to a criminal record and simply reading criminality directly from the body was not entirely
clear.").
20. Id. at 32-59.
21. See id. at 140-43 (describing the case of Will/William West and how fingerprint identification
proved to be a superior system of identification).
22. See Saks & Faigman, supra note 2.
23. See Moriarty, supra note I, at 17-18 ("The circular reasoning problem, however, is far more
easy to spot in the case of phrenology than it is with other forms of forensic individualization, as
evidenced by a 2005 Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decision noting the ACE-V method for
comparing fingerprints 'defies easy testing because it does not require a minimum number of
similarities, but rather operates on a subjective sliding scale.' That is to say, 'I know a match when I
see one.'" (internal citations omitted)).
24. David A. Stoney, Scientific Status, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 32:33 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2007-2008 ed.) [hereinafter MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
25. See, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 71-73 (ist Cir. 2o06) (applying ACE-V to
footwear impressions); United States v. Allen, 2o7 F. Supp. 2d 856, 862 (N.D. Ind. 2002) (same).
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some sort.26 The court in United States v. Mitchell" helpfully summarized
the general understanding of the levels of detail considered by examiners
at the analysis stage:
[There are] three levels of increasing detail, designated as Level i,
Level 2, and Level 3. Level i detail is visible with the naked eye; it is
the familiar pattern of loops, arches, and whorls. Level 2 detail involves
"ridge characteristics"-the patterns of islands, dots, and forks formed
by the ridges as they begin and end and join and divide. The points
where ridges terminate or bifurcate are often referred to as "Galton
points," whose eponym, Sir Francis Galton, first developed a taxonomy
for these points.... Level 3 detail focuses on microscopic variations in
the ridges themselves, such as the slight meanders of the ridges (the
"ridge path") and the locations of sweat pores."
The next step calls upon the examiner to compare the trace evidence
to a candidate source.29 This is accomplished by eyeballing the sample
and suspect source materials side by side. At the evaluation step, the
examiner forms an opinion regarding "individualization," that is,
whether the trace evidence could only have come from the candidate
source. Finally, the last step involves the reexamination by a second
examiner of the trace and reputed source material to verify the match (or
exclusion).3
Each step of the ACE-V process is imbued with subjectivity.
Although there are general standards associated with the analysis
stage-such as clarity of the print and quantity and level of detail-these
are merely illustrative for the "well educated and experienced"
examiner. The comparison stage is similarly ill defined, since what is
required to establish correspondence between the trace evidence and the
suspected source is not known and never specified. Heaped on top of the
subjectivity of the analysis and comparison steps is the most openly
subjective stage, that of evaluation. As Dr. David Stoney has described
this step, it is "a 'leap of faith,"' whereby the examiner decides whether
"it is inconceivable that the fingerprint could have come from another
person's finger."3' No minimum number of corresponding characteristics
are specified in the method and there are no frequency statistics
associated with any one or any set of identifying characteristics used in
these analyses. Finally, the verification stage simply involves another
examiner reviewing the first examiner's work with full knowledge of the
26. Stoney, supra note 24, at 350.
27. 365 F.3 d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).
28. Id. at 221.
29. Stoney, supra note 24, at 362-64.
30. Id. at 353; see also I PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRJED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 897
(4th ed. 2007) (discussing fingerprint identification methods).
31. Stoney, supra note 24, at 354.
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first examiner's opinion."
The absence of any true research basis for anecdotal forensics does
not necessarily mean that they are completely without merit. The
difficulty lies in specifying what merit they possess. As was true with
phrenology and other failed sciences, aspects of anecdotal forensics are
likely to prove true, at least in part. Even leeches have found a
resurgence in modem medicine, though thankfully they are no longer
prescribed for respiratory ailments.33 The failure of anecdotal forensics to
test their hypotheses might suggest that courts should exclude this
evidence altogether until such time when solid research has been done.
This, however, is likely to take a very long time. Courts will have to do
something in the interim, since anecdotal forensics play such a large role
in contemporary criminal trials. Courts must identify some principled
middle ground for determining whether, and how extensively, anecdotal
forensic experts should be allowed to testify.
The primary concern of this Article is not the scientific bankruptcy
of anecdotal forensics, though it is the abiding theme that drives the
analysis. The failures of forensics is a subject ultimately too large for the
current project and one that has been well demonstrated elsewhere.34
Instead, this Article considers two peripheral questions that arise given
the extraordinary influence anecdotal forensics have achieved in criminal
cases. First, how did this happen and, second, what should be done about
it? These two issues are related, since any solution proposed must
account for the circumstances that led to the problem in the first place.
Section two examines why the fundamental failure of anecdotal forensics
has been so slow to be realized by those in the law. Section three asks,
given this realization, how should courts handle this evidence until such
time in the distant future when anecdotal forensics will be relegated to
their proper place in the dustbin of history.
II. WHY HAVE THE FAILURES OF ANECDOTAL FORENSICS ESCAPED THE
LAW'S NOTICE?
From the perspective of the average lawyer or judge, the crisis
confronting anecdotal forensics lies largely below the horizon. Why
should this be so? Anecdotal forensic scientists, of course, would argue
that it is unrecognized because the crisis does not exist. But their
livelihoods depend on the continued acceptance of anecdotal forensics,
so their bare assertions regarding its efficacy, without more, can hardly
32. See, e.g., United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3 d 68, 72-73 (ist Cir. 2o06) ("There is no evidence
that ACE-V mandates blinded verification. Under cross-examination by Mahone's trial counsel, [the
witness] acknowledged only 'a lot of debate' over whether a verifying examiner should be blinded.").
33. FAIGMAN, supra note 6, at 9.
34. See Saks & Faigman, supra note 2; 4-5 MODERN SCIENTIFic EVIDENCE, supra note 24 (two
treatise volumes devoted to the subject of forensic science).
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count as authoritative. Although academic scientists have devoted too
little time to the subject, they invariably are deeply chagrined when they
scrutinize the fields of anecdotal forensics at all closely." In fact, there is
almost certainly no world class scientist who has, or would be willing to,
stake his or her reputation on the validity of anecdotal forensics. But if
anecdotal forensics is so fundamentally flawed, why hasn't this been
widely proclaimed, and revealed by an avalanche of erroneous
identifications? A wide assortment of reasons helps explain the
persistence of anecdotal forensics.
As an historical matter, many failed sciences have held sway for a
very long time, often with little evidence to support them and sometimes
with abundant evidence to doubt them. History is replete with examples
of flawed beliefs that had remarkable staying power. Phrenology, as
discussed in the previous section, was actively believed and practiced
throughout the nineteenth century. 6 Many learned and influential people
believed in the geocentric theory of the universe long after considerable
evidence disproved it. A surprising number of people today believe that
humans did not evolve from lower forms of life, possibly including even
the forty-third President of the United States.37 Bleeding as a therapy for
general physical ailments continued for centuries. In the forensics area
itself, certain technologies have been abandoned that had been practiced
for decades, including paraffin testing,3 aspects of arson investigation,39
and, most recently, comparative bullet-lead analysis.4" Clearly, the fact
that a belief or technology has survived the test of time does not
guarantee that it could survive rigorous scientific tests.
Contributing to the basic failure of the adversarial process to
uncover the profound flaws in anecdotal forensics is the lack of an
independent group of scientists doing work on forensic topics.4' This has
two impacts. On the one hand, it means that there is no one providing
35. See, e.g., Donald Kennedy, Forensic Science: Oxymoron?, 302 SCIENCE 1625, 1625 (2003) ("It's
not that fingerprint analysis is unreliable. The problem, rather, is that its reliability is unverified either
by statistical models of fingerprint variation or by consistent data on error rates."); David M. Siegel et
al., The Reliability of Latent Print Individualization: Brief of Amici Curiae submitted on Behalf of
Scientists and Scholars by the New England Innocence Project, Commonwealth v. Patterson, 42 CRIM.
L. BULL. 21 (2006); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL'Y I43, 170 (2005).
36. See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE HISTORY OF MODERN SCIENCE, supra note 3.
37. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Remarks Roil Debate over Teaching of Evolution, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
3, 2005, at A14.
38. See generally Mary E. Cowan & Patricia L. Purdon, A Study of the "Paraffin Test," 12 J.
FORENSIC ScIs. 19 (1967).
39. See John J. Lentini, Fires, Arsons, and Explosions, in 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra
note 24, § 38:21.
40. John Solomon, A Murder Conviction Tom Apart by a Bullet; In a 1995 Maryland Case, Key
Testimony and the Science Behind It Have Been Discredited, WASH. POST, Nov. 19, 2007, at As
(describing the downfall of the discredited science of bullet-lead comparisons).
41. See Saks & Faigman, supra note 2.
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quality empirical testing demonstrating the accuracy of anecdotal
forensics. On the other, there is no one demonstrating their infirmities,
either.
Forensic scientists are mainly not scientists at all, at least in the
conventional sense of the term. They do not posit and test theories and
hypotheses or investigate natural or social phenomena in order to better
understand them. They are technicians. Following simplistic routines,
albeit with considerable subjective judgment thrown in, they apply
technologies that have themselves never been subjected to rigorous or
extensive validity testing. Most have no graduate training in research
methods and statistics. A survey of forensic scientists revealed that i%
had Ph.D. level research degrees and about 3% had earned a masters
degree.4" Therefore, even if forensic scientists agreed that their
hypotheses were in need of testing, they generally do not have the
training or background to do it. Moreover, forensic scientists are very
busy in their day jobs. They do not have the time or resources to do
original empirical research even if they had the capability or inclination
to do so. The level of scientific work needed in forensics can only come
from the mainstream academic community.
Forensic issues are rarely considered by academic scientists of any
kind. Statisticians, the most likely group to be engaged by forensics, have
largely ignored the subject, though they regularly investigate parallel
problems, such as signal-detection theory.43 There are two basic
impediments to academic scientists' actively and broadly pursuing
research on forensic issues. The first is lack of money, and the second is
lack of theoretical relevance. Research often follows the available
funding. Historically, there has been little government financing
available for basic forensic science research. Agencies such as the
National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health do
not include forensics as part of their mission statements. Probably the
single agency most devoted to funding forensic research is the National
Institute of Justice (NIJ), an arm of the U.S. Department of Justice. Thus
far, NIJ has not been successful in funding cutting-edge research.' This
42. Kenneth G. Furton et al., What Educational Background Do Crime Laboratory Directors
Require from Applicants?, 44 J. FORENSIC ScIs. 128, 130 0999).
43. In short, signal detection theory is concerned with the quantification of the uncertainty
surrounding the task of distinguishing signal and noise. See generally Victoria L. Phillips et al., The
Application of Signal Detection Theory to Decision-Making in Forensic Science, 46 J. FORENSIC SciS.
294 (2OOI); John A. Swets, The Relative Operating Characteristic in Psychology, 182 SCIENCE 900
(1973).
44. Indeed, there is some evidence that indicates that the Justice Department has actively sought
to thwart research efforts. See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint
"Science" Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 627-28 n.122 (2002) (claiming to have "internal
documents of the NIJ" stating that the Institute delayed a research solicitation at the behest of the FBI
until after a Daubert challenge had been heard in the Third Circuit); Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful
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may, at least in part, be a function of the fact that academic scientists
have not considered forensics to be within their domain.
Clearly, before academic scientists can be expected to reform
forensic science, they must be convinced that the subject is relevant and
important to their respective disciplines. But even brief reflection
suggests that forensics could provide a treasure trove of research
possibilities. Statisticians, in particular, would find a surplus of
hypotheses to test in areas such as latent fingerprints, firearms
identification, and handwriting analysis. Indeed, conventional statistical
subjects such as pattern recognition and signal detection theory could be
tested and applied to forensic problems. Moreover, many scientists
would find forensics to be a fertile area to test general theories from their
disciplines. The work of Itiel Dror and colleagues-psychologists
interested in studying cognitive bias-is a particularly good illustration of
this.45 The list matching forensic subjects to established academic
departments is limited only by one's scientific imagination. Forensics,
however, are not to be found in most universities and the explanation
seems to lie in historical fortuity.
Much of the divide between academic and forensic scientists can be
traced to historical circumstances. In nineteenth century America,
science was as likely to be found outside the university as it was to be
found inside it. The university itself did not become fully formed in the
46United States until the twentieth century.4 It was not unusual for serious
science to be explored by wealthy amateurs. Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas Jefferson are archetypes of this model. But, over time, science
became institutionally based. By the mid-twentieth century, most science
was done by professionals associated with universities. These university
departments housed communities of scientists, set professional
standards, and educated succeeding generations of researchers. The
anecdotal forensic sciences, however, went a separate way. They became
an integrated component of the police apparatus 7.4  They became an
instrument of law enforcement, largely controlled by police technicians
and their superiors. Innovation, such as it existed, was done by
nonscientifically trained bureaucrats. Whereas the scientific ideal
promotes constant questioning, the bureaucratic inclination is the
reverse. Forensic identification embraced the bureaucratic ideal of
Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 207-08
(2007) (describing allegations that officials at the U.S. Justice Department interfered with research
efforts on two separate occasions).
45. See infra note 54 and accompanying text.
46. See generally FREDERICK RUDOLPH, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY: A HISTORY (2d
ed. 1990); JOHN R. THELIN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION (2004).
47. Cf Giannelli, supra note 44, at 221-22.
[Vol. 59:979
LESSONS FROM THE HISTORY OF SCIENCE
perpetuating the status quo. Substantial questioning, testing, rethinking,
and innovation in handwriting or toolmark identification, for instance,
would mean that those trained in the old ways would be in danger of
becoming obsolete.
It can be readily assumed that anecdotal forensic experts believe in
what they do. The malady in forensics is not fraud, it is indifference. In
fact, anecdotal forensics may be particularly susceptible to confirmation
bias. One very significant problem is that anecdotal technicians receive
imperfect feedback, since ground truth is very often unknown. A
defendant's conviction or plea agreement can provide some information,
certainly, but the former has a not insubstantial error rate and the latter
may not always be a good indicator of forensic accuracy. In fact, a guilty
verdict may not demonstrate the accuracy of a particular anecdotal
forensic identification at all. The main reason for this is that forensic
examiners do not make identifications in a vacuum.49 They almost
invariably know the other evidence in the case. If the suspect was found
with blood on his shirt, a gun with the same caliber as the murder
weapon, and was sexually involved with the victim's wife, it is
exceedingly unlikely that a firearms identification expert would fail to
find a "match" between the suspect's weapon and the markings on the
shell casings recovered at the scene. At the very least, any ambiguities
found would be resolved in favor of a match. As a practical matter,
therefore, the information forensic examiners employ to make an
identification is not simply a comparison of a forensic sample to a known
exemplar, it includes all of the other information known to the police at
the time. This is one reason, among many, why defendants do not have a
long list of erroneous identifications." Forensic experts can be right most
of the time even if their tests are almost completely useless.
Most forensic examiners, in fact, would probably have a high actual
48. Although there has yet to be an extensive study of the forensic bureaucracy, there is little
reason to believe that it operates differently than other self-perpetuating institutions that have been
the subject of research. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
DO AND WHY THEY Do IT (1989).
49. D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic
Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (2002).
50. Courts often point to this fact to support admission. See, e.g., United States v. Liera Plaza, 188
F. Supp. 2d 549, 566 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("It has been open to defense counsel to present examples of
erroneous identifications attributable to FBI examiners, and no such examples have been
forthcoming."). In United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000), the court used this
argument, but in a particularly obtuse way: "The government points out correctly that if anyone were
to come across a case in which two different fingers had identical fingerprints, that news would flash
around the legal world at the speed of light. It has not happened in too years." Id. at 854. The issue in
these cases, of course, is not whether "two different fingers [might have] identical fingerprints," but
whether a latent print might be mistakenly identified as matching a known print. This has occurred
many times. See Simon A. Cole. More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint
Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1027-28 (2005).
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"hit" rate if this statistic were ever measured. But they are working from
a population with a very high base rate. The truly relevant issue involves
how much information, if any, the forensic identification adds to the
other evidence available. Because anecdotal forensic technicians have
not studied their subject quantitatively, this figure is unknown. But it
should surprise no one if common experience indicates an exceedingly
low error rate for anecdotal forensic experts. They are playing with a
loaded deck. If the base rate of guilt for those arrested is 8o% (and it
could be considerably higher), having a perceived success rate that is
very high-however this might be defined by practitioners of these dark
arts-is not very difficult. This is especially so if no one is actually
counting.'
Much of the discriminating value of anecdotal forensics probably
comes during the investigation phase of the criminal justice process. For
example, if the firing pin of the weapon used in a killing was round, as
indicated by the mark it left on the cartridge casing found at the scene, a
gun with a square firing pin could not have been the murder weapon
unless it had been substantially altered. Similarly, if a latent print almost
certainly came from the perpetrator, a suspect might be excluded if none
of his or her ten fingerprints match it. These cases, of course, never reach
the courtroom, but the value of such exculpatory use should not be
discounted. Many anecdotal forensics, however, are so subjectively
manipulable, that they cannot even be used for exclusion. For instance,
handwriting identification analysts cannot exclude a handwriting sample
that does not resemble the suspect's writing, since the person might have
disguised it in the unknown writing or when completing the known
exemplars. If considerable evidence exists to show that the accused
committed the crime in question, handwriting identification will never
exculpate him or her. Similarly, the task of excluding a suspect as the
person who left a particular unidentified latent print is a challenging task.
It requires comparing every part of every finger to ensure that the person
conclusively did not leave the print. 2
Because forensic scientists routinely have knowledge of the other
evidence in the case, they are inevitably vulnerable to being affected by
cognitive bias. It is a well known phenomenon in psychology that people
tend to see what they expect to see. For example, consider,
hypothetically of course, that four FBI fingerprint examiners are given a
set of twenty "likely matches" (generated by a computer database
fingerprint identification system) for a latent fingerprint left on evidence
51. See Zabell, supra note 35 ("The argument that no latent print has ever been found to match
the rolled print of a different person is ... misleading because no systematic search for such pairs on
the entire databank of millions of fingerprints has ever been performed.").
52. Stoney, supra note 24, at 356-57.
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found at the scene of a terrorist bombing. 3 If one of the "suspects" were
a Muslim convert with military training in explosives, knowledge of this
information might very well lead an examiner, or even all four
examiners, to declare a match when, in fact, it was not a match. There is
certainly no reason to believe that forensic examiners could escape such
cognitive bias when it affects everyone else. Indeed, research by Itiel
Dror and colleagues appears to confirm not only that this bias exists in
latent print examinations, but that it is quite robust. 4 Most disturbing,
however, is that latent print examination, the supposed gold standard of
forensics, would seem to have relatively less room for cognitive biases to
intrude in identification judgments. If cognitive bias is a significant
problem in latent print identification, it almost certainly is an even worse
problem in the less well-developed areas of forensics.
An additional reason forensic experts are prone to confirmation bias
is that their approach to the subject is rarely challenged adequately when
they testify. This is so for two reasons-lawyers and judges. Most lawyers
are not well trained in research methods or statistics. With criminal
defense lawyers, and especially public defenders, this lack of training is
aggravated by overwhelming case loads. Even if they were so inclined,
and had the basic knowledge to do so, public defenders have insufficient
time to fully prepare against the well-traveled prosecution expert.
Criminal defense lawyers also have few resources to hire experts of their
own. And even if they did have such resources, most forensic experts
learned their trade working with the police, and may not be generally
available for defense work.
Compounding lawyers' failure to adequately challenge anecdotal
forensic experts is the stunning failure of judges to provide any sort of
check on this evidence. Although it appears that judges have learned
enough science to gate-keep in civil cases, where plaintiffs are often
turned away at the inception of the suit, they have not shown the same
fortitude on the criminal side of the docket when prosecutors proffer bad
science.55 Judges, on the whole, seem to know enough science to exclude
53. This hypothetical, of course, is based on the Brandon Mayfield case, in which an Oregon
attorney was mistakenly identified as being involved in the 2004 Madrid terrorist bombing. See Cole,
supra note 5o, at ios6. Four FBI examiners confirmed the identification of his fingerprint. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., A REVIEW OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON
MAYFIELD CASE (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/so6oi/PDFlist.htm.
54. Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 74, 77 (2006) ("Our study shows that it is possible to alter
identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a different context."); see
also Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of
Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC ScIs. (forthcoming July 2008), available at http://users.ecs.soton.
ac.uk/id/JFS%2oexpert%2oreliability%2oand%2obiasability.pdf; Itiel E. Dror & D. Charlton, Why
Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 6oo (2006).
55. D. Michael Risinger. Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being
Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99. 99 (2000).
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complex scientific evidence that is based on flawed toxicology,
epidemiology and multiple regression analysis. How is it possible that a
judge who recognized the methodological or statistical weaknesses in a
mass toxic tort case could be blind to the gross methodological failures of
anecdotal forensics? The problem inherent in the courts is not simply
ignorance-though there may be plenty of that too-but a fundamental
lack of will.
The courts' failure of will is likely associated with two basic fears.
The first is fear of embarrassment and the second is fear of the
consequences. Anecdotal forensics, such as latent fingerprints, firearms
identification and handwriting, are such longstanding staples of criminal
prosecutions that their exclusion will inevitably lead to publicity and
even ridicule. When a Maryland state trial judge excluded latent
fingerprint identification in October 2007, she became the subject of a
series of articles in the local paper.6 Judges, especially elected state
judges, do not ordinarily seek out notoriety. This may be particularly so
when the subject is not squarely within the judge's area of expertise, such
as science. It is even more so when the subject is latent fingerprints,
which enjoys such popular approbation that excluding this evidence
might make the presiding judge appear unbalanced. In United States v.
Havvard,57 for example, the trial court agreed to hold a hearing on the
validity of latent fingerprint identification despite the fact that it believed
its "decision may strike some as comparable to a breathless
announcement that the sky is blue and the sun rose in the east
yesterday.""5 And to be sure, questioning the fact that the sun revolves
around the earth is not good for anyone's career, whether it was Galileo
or, apparently, the trial judge in Havvard.
The second fear judges confront when considering the prospect of
excluding anecdotal forensics is the potential collapse of criminal
prosecutions. From the judiciary's perspective, the wholesale implosion
of forensics could cause a crisis in the criminal justice system at several
levels. Foremost, it would weaken ongoing prosecutions." This might
mean fewer convictions or, of possibly greater concern, fewer plea
agreements. The perceived power of forensic identification evidence,
such as latent fingerprints and firearms identification, almost certainly
56. See Jennifer McMenamin, Judge Bars Use of Fingerprints in Murder Trial, BALT. SUN, Oct. 23,
2007, at iA; Jennifer McMenamin, Science, Tradition at War in Forensics: Fingerprints Ruling Roils
Mainstream, BALT. SUN, Oct. 29, 2007, at IA.
57. 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
58. Id. at 849.
59. See Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Uses and Effects of Forensic Science in the Adjudication of
Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCIS. 1730, 1748 (1987) (reporting a survey indicating that "[a]bout one
quarter of the citizens who had served on juries which were presented with scientific evidence believed
that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their verdicts-from guilty to not
guilty").
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contributes to many defendants' decisions to avoid trial. Blanket
exclusion of such evidence would weaken prosecutors' cases
considerably. Beyond the current criminal docket, there exists a
brooding mass of already decided cases at various stages of appellate or
habeas review. Broad recognition of the inherent weakness of anecdotal
forensics might lead to a rush to the courthouse.
Wholesale exclusion of anecdotal forensics, therefore, is not a
solution likely to be embraced any time soon by the courts. In United
States v. Green,6° Judge Nancy Gertner made extensive factual findings
supporting her conclusion that the basis for firearms identification was
unacceptable and could not support the proffered expert testimony,
much less support the toolmark expert's claim that he could identify the
suspect weapon "to the exclusion of all others in the world.",6' Yet she
also recognized the political reality confronting her if she were to exclude
this evidence in its entirety. In explaining her decision to admit the
• 62
toolmark examiner's testimony in part, she observed as follows:
I reluctantly come to the above conclusion because of my confidence
that any other decision will be rejected by appellate courts, in light of
precedents across the country, regardless of the finding I have made.
While I recognize that the Daubert-Kumho standard does not require
illusory perfection of a television show (CSI this wasn't), when liberty
hangs in the balance-and, in the case of the defendants facing the
death penalty, life itself-the standard should be higher than were met
in this case, and than have been imposed across the country. The more
courts admit this type of toolmark evidence without requiring
documentation, proficiency testing, or evidence of reliability, the more
sloppy practices will endure; we should require more.
If the political reality is largely as Judge Gertner describes it in
Green, the question is what to do about it. One could rail against the
injustice and stupidity of any admission of such fatally flawed science, but
tilting at windmills does have its costs in mental health. There may,
however, be a middle ground, one that will permit the continued
introduction of anecdotal forensics in some form, but which will both
cause the least amount of injury and be most likely to lead to systemic
reform. The next section explores this middle ground.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE WITH ANECDOTAL FORENSICS?
Although much of forensic identification science is failed science, it
60. 405 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2005).
61. Id. at 114.
62. Although Judge Gertner admitted the toolmark expert, she limited the expert to describing
similarities between the known and unknown marks and did not allow the expert to testify that the
marks "matched." See id. at 124; infra notes 64-76 and accompanying text (discussing further the
merits of Judge Gertner's solution).
63. Green, 405 F. Supp. 2d at to9.
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might still have something to offer the law. It just might not be very
much. Foremost, of course, anecdotal forensics can play an enormous
role in investigations. Together with other evidence such as apparent
motives and statements by witnesses and suspects, the marks left by
fingers, feet, teeth, firing pins, tools, and so forth can help complete the
picture of what happened and who did it. The more information
contained in this sort of evidence, the better the resolution of the picture.
Pristine imprints of three fingers found on the handle of a gun that was
left by the side of the victim will provide important evidence for police.
But even quite fragmentary evidence might help exclude certain prime
suspects and thus contribute to solving the case. Although well-funded
research programs dedicated to forensics would likely improve this
investigative function considerably, the current state of the art can
certainly be useful during the investigation phase.
Yet forensic experts offer to answer a wide range of questions that
courts need answered. Does the fingerprint fragment found at the crime
scene "match" one of the defendant's fingers? Do the marks left in the
soft metal of a bomb "match" a tool in the possession of the defendant?
Do the markings on a cartridge casing "match" those that are left on
other casings by the firing pin of the defendant's handgun? Forensic
experts offer opinions about these and sundry other matters every day.
And they have been doing it for a very long time. Yet there is no
developed science of pattern identification; there are few universities
with forensics departments and there appear to be none doing systematic
work on forensic identification." If anecdotal forensics offers no
objective basis for individualization, that is, conclusively opining that the
trace matches the specimen which ties to the defendant, how are courts
to respond to such proffers of certainty by these putative experts?
Trial courts, of course, are supremely practical institutions. They
must decide concrete cases in a timely fashion. They do not have the
luxury of decrying the lack of rigorous research and academically railing
against the failed state of forensic science. First of all, there are
thousands, if not tens of thousands, of cases in which forensic evidence
was a key component of a successful prosecution. Judicial recognition of
the uncertain basis for forensics would cast a shadow over these
64. See Stoney, supra note 24, at 356-57 (describing the practical difficulty of determining
definitively that a particular person did not leave a particular latent print).
65. It would be worthwhile to conduct an extensive survey of forensic graduate programs in the
United States. I would hypothesize that few programs offer sophisticated training in research methods
and statistics -given how little of this sort of research is done-and that most programs are designed
to train practicing professionals, not professional research scientists. The only arguable exception is
George Washington University, which has various iterations of Masters programs, but does not offer
the Ph.D. See George Washington University, Department of Forensic Sciences, Overview of Forensic
Sciences Programs, http://www.gwu.edu/-forensic/program.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2008).
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decisions. Second, there are thousands of ongoing cases that involve one
or another forensic identification technique. The success of these
prosecutions might depend on the continued allowance of forensic expert
opinion. Third, juries have likely come to expect that forensic evidence
will be available to buttress prosecutors' cases. Wholesale exclusion of
identification forensics would undermine general perceptions of
prosecutors' cases. Fourth, although forensic identification expertise may
not be perfect, indeed might not even be particularly accurate, it must be
better than nothing. Years of experience must demonstrate at least some
value to this expertise, thus supporting its continued use until something
better comes along.
Courts generally seem to be unaware of the pending crisis in forensic
science. Although cracks have appeared along the way-with a few
judges willing to challenge the prevailing orthodoxY of uncritical
acceptance of anecdotal forensic expert testimony -most courts
continue blithely admitting these putative experts and their testimony
today just as it was admitted one hundred years ago. Indeed, many of the
basic technologies have changed little over those years. Some courts
actually believe that the fact this technology has been employed largely
unchanged for the past century is a mark in its favor. Certainly, it
contributes to the general belief that experience validates forensic
practice. Ironically, however, the same courts who point to this long
experience also believe that progress will be made as a matter of course.
But if the technology has largely gone unchanged for the past one
hundred years, the next hundred years are likely to look pretty much the
same, unless something happens. Why, after all, should anyone expect
modern technicians to step up and innovate now? Maintaining the status
quo will have just one effect: it will maintain the status quo.
Clearly, current practice must change, but change will be long in
coming. This section considers what should be done in the meantime.
Specifically, is there an approach that is both principled and likely to
promote the revolution in forensics research that is needed? Courts need
to identify a middle ground, one that permits anecdotal expertise that
arguably has value, but which limits its reach. Courts should have to
explain why they believe that such experience-based testimony will assist
the trier of fact.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge" and specifically provides that an expert can be
"qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
66. See, e.g., United States v. Fujii, 152 F. Supp. 2d 939 (N.D. I11. 2000) (excluding handwriting
expertise entirely); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62, 70-71 (D. Mass. 1999) (not allowing
handwriting expert to testify to identity).
67. See United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848,852 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
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education." ' The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2000 amendment to
Rule 702, which was intended to reflect the sensibilities expressed in
Daubert, states:
If the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then the
witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court's
gatekeeping function requires more than simply "taking the expert's
word for it.
69
If forensic experts wish to have their testimony admitted on some
theory that they have developed "specialized knowledge" by virtue of
their experience, it is incumbent on courts to ask them to explain how
this was done. Of course, education and training cannot alone buttress
their claims, since these sources of knowledge are themselves based on
the experience of others. This experience too must be explained. But
how might this be done?
Repeated application of the ACE-V method purportedly gives
forensic identification experts insights regarding how they reached the
conclusion of individualization. But this is not a plausible explanation.
First of all, individualization itself is not plausible." While it may be true
that every person's fingerprint is unique, science cannot say, and makes
no pretension of being able to say, whether this is true. Moreover, it is
entirely irrelevant. The task of latent fingerprint examination does not
encompass full prints. No one has ever suggested that particular ridge
characteristics are unique. In practice, the problem concerns how likely
certain ridge characteristics would be found in a random sample of the
population. This is the operative question. Hence, the basic approach
forensic identification specialists take is probabilistic, whether they have
any appreciation for this fact or not. The correspondence between the
marks of trace evidence recovered at the scene and the marks made by
the reputed source can only be described in statistical terms. However
many details the two have in common, there is some unknown likelihood
that another finger, gun, foot or set of teeth was the true source of the
latent print, toolmark, footprint, or bitemark.
The only form of currency in which experience might have any value
in anecdotal forensics is with the frequencies of the match characteristics.
For example, one might plausibly argue that most handgun firing pins are
square or rectangular, so that the finding that both the defendant's gun
and the gun used in the crime had a round firing pin is of some
68. FED. R. EVID. 702.
69. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43
F.3 d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995)).
70. See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science,
6i VAND. L. REV. 199, 208-09 (2oo8).
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significance. Saying just how significant (i.e., whether the class size is i%
or Io%) may or may not be within the expert's experience. There may be
similar aspects of handwriting identification, such as what percentage of
American-born writers cross their sevens. In most cases, however, such
experience-based frequency estimates will not be plausible. The average
fingerprint expert might be able to estimate the percentage of
fingerprints having arch, loop, or whorl patterns (i.e., Level i detail),7'
but they are not likely to be able to make any reliable statement
regarding the frequency of particular ridge characteristics (i.e., Level 2
detail).7" Since Level i detail is actually not very detailed, this
experiential skill set is not much help as a practical matter.
If an expert cannot say how it is that his or her experience "leads to
the conclusion reached" (i.e., individualization), then he or she should
not be permitted to testify to that conclusion. In fact, in many
handwriting cases, this is exactly the sort of "Solomonic compromise"
that has been adopted.73 At least a dozen courts have held that
handwriting identification experts can testify to similarities and
differences between known and unknown writing samples, but cannot
offer an opinion regarding identity of authorship. This basic approach
could be extended to all areas of anecdotal forensic expertise.74
The Solomonic compromise instituted by some courts, however, is
too generous to anecdotal expertise. These cases often allow the expert
to go beyond what their experience actually supports. Although they
prohibit experts from opining on the ultimate issue of identity, they allow
them to comment on the frequency of finding particular dissimilarities or
similarities in the population more generally.75 Under Rule 702, this level
of detail should only be permitted if the experts can explain how their
experience would give them reliable information about such frequencies.
The fact that there are similarities between evidence and a reputed
source has relevance to the trial process, even if it is impossible to say
how much relevance it has. Consider, for example, evidence that the
71. Arch patterns have no delta (i.e., a knot formed by the ridge lines), loops have one delta, and
whorls have been characterized by the presence of two deltas. See Oleg S. Avdeychik & Kenneth A.
Lagerstrom, Dispensation of Dermatoglyphic Whorls, HUMANHAND.COM, Sept. 24, 1999,
http://www.humanhand.com/dispensation.html.
72. See supra note 28 (discussing the three levels of detail involved in the analysis of fingerprint
patterns).
73. See D. Michael Risinger, Handwriting Identification, in MODERN SCIENTiFIC EVIDENCE, supra
note 24, § 33:7.
74. Limiting a forensic expert to only describing similarities and differences was the approach
that Judge Louis Pollak adopted in his original opinion limiting fingerprint evidence. He later reversed
himself and allowed the expert opinion without limitation. See United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F.
Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
75. See Risinger, supra note 73, at 406-08 (collecting cases and discussing the problems inherent
in permitting experts to testify regarding the frequencies of certain handwriting characteristics).
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perpetrator of a burglary in San Francisco drove a red Mustang
convertible with a black top. If the defendant owns such a car, this
evidence would certainly be admissible, even if no competent evidence
was offered regarding how many such cars are on the road. Indeed, if an
expert could explain how his or her experience supports such a
conclusion-say he or she is a Ford mechanic-the expert might be
permitted to say that large numbers of these cars can be found on the, 6
roads around San Francisco. Suppose, however, that the suspect car had
other "individuating" characteristics, such as a dented front-right fender,
a broken left tail light, and an "Impeach Bush" bumper sticker. This level
of detail would be highly relevant and surely admissible. The Ford
mechanic, however, would probably not be able to make a statement
about the frequency of finding cars matching this description in and
around San Francisco, since he or she could not explain how his or her
experience could support such an opinion. Presumably this number
would not be very high, though admittedly higher in San Francisco than
in Provo.
Forensic identification experts are in a similar situation to that of the
Ford mechanic. The only real difference is that in practice, there would
be no need for the Ford mechanic, because the information about the
suspect car would be developed through lay testimony. Forensic experts,
in contrast, are often needed to either identify the similarities between
the suspect and source materials or to shepherd them for the jury's
consideration. For example, in the case of latent fingerprints, experts can
display the known and unknown prints side by side and identify the
characteristics that correspond between the two. They would not,
however-absent some explanation for the basis of their knowledge-be
permitted to testify about the likelihood of finding such correspondence
in the population at large. And, certainly, they could not make any
statement regarding individualization. Of course, common sense tells us,
and would tell the jury, that the more correspondence between the
suspect and source materials, the more likely that the latter produced the
former. But the jury does not need an expert to tell them this.
CONCLUSION
Many subjects of forensic identification -including, among others,
latent fingerprints, firearms, handwriting, and bitemarks-have received
little or no sustained research attention. They are largely based on
anecdotal experience and supposition. Indeed, in many ways, anecdotal
forensics resemble other historical failures of science, including, in
particular, phrenology. Like phrenology, anecdotal forensics are based
76. In all likelihood, it must be noted, a judge would exclude such evidence on the basis that most
San Francisco jurors would know this fact, and thus the expert's testimony would be a waste of time.
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on inductive experience, have not been subjected to systematic tests,
conform to expectations, "prove" what is already presumed to be known,
and seem to have great practical utility for society. Moreover, like
phrenology, anecdotal forensics employ superficially objective methods
to support their subjective judgments. To the untrained eye, and
especially the eyes of lawyers and judges, anecdotal forensics look
scientific. Phrenologists used highly detailed and specific maps of skulls
and the corresponding bumps found on them, and identification experts
use methods such as ACE-V. A century from now, however, the
anecdotally-based beliefs of forensic experts are likely to survive much as
phrenology endures today. They will be no more than abject lessons from
the annals of the history of science.
The realization that anecdotal forensics are largely bereft of
intellectual content leads to two fundamental questions, both considered
in this Article. First, how did this happen and, second, what should be
done about it?
The current situation whereby anecdotal forensics are routinely
admitted into criminal prosecutions as "scientific evidence" is largely a
product of a convergence of ineptitudes. The first lies in the structure
and nature of the fields that practice forensic identification science.
Outside of only a few exceptions, forensic identification experts are not
research scientists. They are primarily affiliated with police laboratories
and they merely apply the technologies they were trained to use. They
are bureaucrat-technicians who, for the most part, do not have the
training in statistics or research methods that would allow them to
critically assess the validity of those technologies. Moreover, subjects
such as latent fingerprints and handwriting are not studied by
mainstream scientists at major research universities. Anecdotal forensics,
therefore, possess the patina of science, but there is no scientific
community filling in the substance.
Compounding the superficiality of the science, lawyers and judges
have little ability to distinguish expert opinion based on the bedrock of
high quality research and those based on sand. Most lawyers have little
training in the methods of science, and criminal defense lawyers-those
charged with examining this testimony in court-often have
overwhelming caseloads and undersized budgets. Judges also suffer from
lack of scientific sophistication, but they appear further crippled by fear
of embarrassment and fear of the consequences if they were to exclude
this evidence. Anecdotal forensics have been a mainstay of criminal trials
for over a hundred years. Excluding them now would put into doubt
many prosecutions and, many courts seem to worry, the mental stability
of the presiding judge.
Since it is unlikely that scientists or courts will soon change course,
some middle ground must be identified for the continued employment of
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forensic experts. Such a course would allow anecdotal experts to testify
regarding general similarities and differences found between known
fingerprints, bullets, handwriting and teeth, and unknown latent prints,
cartridge casings, signatures and bitemarks. But such testimony should
be limited in that, without supporting data, the expert would be
precluded from discussing the frequency or likelihood associated with
finding these commonalities (or differences).
This solution is only an interim measure, but could lead to more
fundamental and sustained reform. Specifically, anecdotal forensics will
only receive the research attention they deserve if mainstream scientists
begin to take notice. This will occur only if money becomes available for
such research projects. So long as courts maintain the status quo, there is
little incentive for government agencies to invest in basic research. Yet
courts need not move far for government bureaucrats and policy makers
to notice. Of course, even once they do notice, both government and the
scientific establishment move at a glacial pace. Like phrenology, then, it
might yet take a century to fully see the folly of our forensic ways. But, in
the meantime, at least we will be moving in the right direction.
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